Mutiny on the River Tigris - a report in Iraq

The one-week war between Al Mahdi militia and the Iraqi government, has left more than 270 people dead in Al Sadr City, Basra and Karbala.

Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki described the Sadrists (former parliamentary allies, ministers in his cabinet, and friends) as "ignorant" and "paid agents who corrupted all posts they had assumed". He added: "We spoke before about Al Qaida but there are amongst us who are worst then Al Qaida".

In addition to Shiite blood, there is mutiny in the air, where some Iraqi soldiers are laying down their arms, saying that they will not engage in a civil war with their fellow countrymen, showing just how popular Al Sadr is in the Shiite community.

Others have complained that instead of using so much force against the Sadrists, it would be wiser to train their weapons against the Americans. Still a third group has come up to Al Sadr and offered him their weapons, saying that they have switched sides and will now fight with the Mahdi Army.

Things brings back scary memories that the Iraqis know only too well of Iranian soldiers refusing to shoot on day two or three of the revolution - despite orders from the Shah - so as not to drag their nation into civil war.
Some claim that all of this is part of a deal hammered out in Baghdad earlier last March between Al Maliki, the Americans, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The Iranians, who had encouraged Al Maliki to deal with Al Sadr back in 2006-2007, were now willing to turn a blind eye as he crushed the Shiite militia.

This cooperation (with the price being Al Sadr) would please the Americans, who would respond in similar goodwill by softening their tone against Tehran. That - illogical as it may sound - is one option floating around political circles in the Arab World.

It is hard to believe especially since other sources confirm that during the past 10 months, Iran has politically, financially and militarily invested heavily in Al Mahdi Army.

Apparently the Iranians believe that the US President George W. Bush will not leave the White House with Hamas and Hezbollah still alive and kicking, Syria and Iran surviving US pressure, Iraq in flames and Al Qaida firmly in control of major pockets throughout the Muslim World.

Of all the potential targets, the Iranians believe that both Hezbollah and Hamas are the easiest for the Israelis and the Americans to tackle. The war on Hamas started in January and will continue in what remains of Bush's term at the White House.

Coming next is an Israeli war - this time a ground invasion -on Hezbollah. Iran, worried at the future of its regional proxy, has started planning for the "day after" Hezbollah leaves the scene in Lebanon.
The plan is to create a new Hezbollah in Iraq through Al Mahdi Army. The Americans are taking pre-emptive measures to bring down Al Mahdi Army before it is even re-born.

Reasonable
Both stories sound reasonable, but it remains to be noted that Al Mahdi Army was never an Iranian instrument in Iraqi politics. Al Sadr was inspired by the Iranian model and wanted to create a similar theocracy in Baghdad, which was Iran-free.

He did not want foreigners to interfere and was described as an Iraqi Arab nationalist, rather than a Shiite nationalist as Abdulaziz Al Hakim. The later had always been frowned upon by Al Sadr for accepting sanctuary in Tehran during the days of Saddam Hussain.

Al Sadr always trashed him for calling for the creation of a autonomous Shiite district in southern Iraq. In 1980-1988, the Badr Brigade (under orders from Al Hakim family) fought alongside the Iranian Army against the Iraqis. They were fighting for Shiite nationalism (since a bulk of the Iraqi Army was Sunni) rather than Iraqi nationalism.

Al Sadr on the other hand never left Iraq even after his father was assassinated by Saddam Hussain. At one point in 2006, one of Al Sadr's allies (then turned opponent) named Ayatollah Mahmoud Hasani had his troops storm the Iranian Consulate in Basra, torch it, and bring down the Iranian flag. That is how independent from Iran Al Sadr was.

He once used his weight within the Shiite community to prevent the election of Iran's proxy Adel Abdul Mahdi to the job of prime minister.
Instead he supported somebody such as Ebrahim Jaafari (who is now lobbying on his behalf with Al Maliki) because Al Jaafari had refused to take refugee in Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War but rather, moved on to neutral London so as not to be seen as an Iranian stooge.

The truth is that if it were not for Al Sadr, Al Maliki would never have become prime minister. The man was a lightweight in Shiite politics and he needed the backing of a young, credible, and popular leader such as Al Sadr.

Al Maliki promised protection from the Americans. Al Sadr pledged backing of grassroots Shiites. This formula worked (until December 2006) and in reward Al Sadr's men were given portfolios, such as health, commerce, and education - in addition to the 30-seat parliamentary bloc that they enjoyed.
Something seemed wrong. Al Sadr was opposed to the post-2003 order because it was brought about by the Americans but by joining the Cabinet and parliament, he was legitimising this same order.
This did wonders to Al Maliki's reputation, and gave Al Sadr's team fresh territory to cultivate members - within the apparatus of government, dishing out services and patronage via charity funds and hospitals under his control, in addition to imposing his hallmark on elementary and middle school curriculums.
Pretty soon, however, the relationship became a burden for the prime minister. He repeatedly covered up for misconduct of the Sadrists and refused to send Iraqi troops or the US army into Al Sadr City, receiving great criticism from Iraqi Sunnis of being a stooge of Al Sadr.

They were further united with the hanging of Saddam in December 2006, as the Iraqi Shiite community was coming under fire from Sunnis, and as Al Sadr's men attended and co-hanged the ex-president under the watchful eye of Al Maliki's officials.

Things broke down, however, in early 2007 when Al Sadr quarrelled with Al Maliki because the latter failed to discuss US troop withdrawal with President Bush.
He threatened to step out of government and rather than plead him to say, Al Maliki nodded, as if it were a blessing in disguise. Al Sadr left the government in the summer of 2007 and Al Maliki did nothing to bring him back.

Al Sadr had become too much of an embarrassment and Al Maliki wanted to get rid of him. Step one was political divorce; step two is the war we are currently seeing in Basra.